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ABSTRACT

External world skeptics argue that we have no knowledge of the external world.
Contextualist theories of knowledge attempt to address the skeptical problem by
maintaining that arguments for skepticism are effective only in certain contexts in which
the standards for knowledge are so high that we cannot reach them. In ordinary contexts,
however, the standards for knowledge fall back down to reachable levels and we again
are able to have knowledge of the external world. In order to address the objection that
contextualists confuse the standards for knowledge with the standards for warranted
assertion, Keith DeRose appeals to the knowledge account of warranted assertion to
argue that if one is warranted in asserting p, one also knows p. A skeptic, however, can
maintain a context-invariant view of the knowledge account of assertion, in which case
such an account would not provide my help to contextualism.

INDEX WORDS:

contextualism, radical skepticism, theories of assertion,
knowledge, relevant alternatives, external world

CONTEXTUALIST RESPONSES TO SKEPTICISM

by

LUANNE GUTHERIE

Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
in the College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University

2007

Copyright by
Luanne Su-Lou Gutherie
2007

CONTEXTUALIST RESPONSES TO SKEPTICISM

by

LUANNE GUTHERIE

Major Professor:
Committee:

Electronic Version Approved:
Office of Graduate Studies
College of Arts and Sciences
Georgie State University
August 2007

Stephen Jacobson
George Rainbolt
Andrea Scarantino

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction....................................................................................................................... 1
I. The Skeptical Problem Concerning the External World.......................................... 2
II. G.E. Moore’s Proof of an External World and Contextualist Intuitions .............. 6
III. Relevant Alternatives and Contextualists ............................................................. 11
IV. Some Objections ...................................................................................................... 17
V. A Larger Problem ..................................................................................................... 30
Works Cited..................................................................................................................... 40

1

Introduction
Contextualist theories of knowledge are frequently formulated with the intent of
responding to skepticism about the external world. Such theories attempt to establish that
the context in which the skeptic makes her argument imposes different requirements for
knowledge than that required by the context of our everyday knowledge claims. Thus,
the skeptical conclusion cannot be generalized to cover our ordinary knowledge claims,
leaving much of our knowledge about the external world unscathed. In what follows, I
will argue that this strategy, while insightful in pointing out the role that context plays in
determining when we can appropriately say S knows that p, nonetheless fails to show that
context determines when we can truly say S knows that p.
Following a brief description of what skepticism about the external world
amounts to, I will explore several of the more popular contextualist arguments against
skepticism and the intuitions upon which such theories are based. Having done so, I will
then be in a position to spotlight one of contextualism’s greatest strengths: it seems to
resemble our normal justificatory practices more so than what is called for by the skeptic.
The skeptic can answer this, however, by drawing a distinction between appropriate
assertions of knowledge and true assertions of knowledge. Any contextualist theory must
ultimately link these two concepts together in order to be successful and thus far, they
have failed to do so. But first we must get a handle on the problem that contextualism
professes to solve.

2

I. The Skeptical Problem Concerning the External World
There is a philosophical problem concerning our knowledge of the world around
us, or as philosophers like to say, the external world. The problem is that, contrary to
popular belief, we might have no such knowledge. We commonly believe ourselves to
know many things, such as “I am currently sitting in a chair,” or “My husband is
watching television outside.” The skeptic (the philosopher who argues we have no
external world knowledge) will then raise the possibility that we might be dreaming or
we might be systematically deceived by an evil demon. If such were the case, then we
would have no basis for thinking that our beliefs about the external world are true. I feel
the chair under me and see that I am sitting in it. But if I were in a dream, I would have
these experiences regardless of whether I am actually sitting in the chair. Thus, such
sensory experience cannot serve as evidence one way or another.

And if sensory

experience does not count as evidence, it is not clear what else is left. Without any other
way of distinguishing between a dream world or the real one, we are not justified in any
of our beliefs about the external world.
This type of skepticism has often been attributed to Rene Descartes. Sitting by
the fire one night, he begins evaluating the many beliefs he had acquired since childhood
in an attempt to determine if any of them could count as knowledge. Realizing that most
of his beliefs were either acquired through or were in some way dependent on the senses,
Descartes attempts to ascertain whether the senses are a reliable source of knowledge.
He concludes that they are not:
“…there are many…beliefs about which doubt is quite impossible…for
example, that I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dressing-
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gown, holding this piece of paper in my hands, and so on.…How often,
asleep at night, am I convinced of just such familiar events—that I am
here in my dressing-gown, sitting by the fire—when in fact I am lying
undressed in bed! Yet at the moment my eyes are certainly wide awake
when I look at this piece of paper; I shake my head and it is not asleep; as
I stretch out and feel my hand I do so deliberately, and I know what I am
doing. All this would not happen with such distinctness to someone
asleep. Indeed! As if I did not remember other occasions when I have
been tricked by exactly similar thoughts while asleep! As I think about
this more carefully, I see plainly that there are never any sure signs by
means of which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep.”1
Descartes evaluates the belief that his circumstances are indeed as they appear to be—
that he is in reality sitting by the fire in a dressing-gown, holding a piece of paper in his
hand. The possibility that he might be dreaming, however, immediately presses itself
upon him. If he is only dreaming that he is sitting by the fire in his dressing-gown, then
he is not really sitting by the fire. Despite appearances to the contrary, he is lying in bed.
Descartes’ belief that he is sitting by the fire would thus be false.
Let us look at this scenario a little more closely. The knowledge claim that
Descartes is evaluating is that he is sitting by the fire in his dressing-gown. He justifies
this claim by referring to his senses. It certainly appears to him as though he is sitting by
the fire. He probably feels the chair under him, sees the fire before him, feels its warmth.
He casts doubt on this basis for his claim, however, by introducing an alternative
hypothesis that equally accounts for the appearances to his senses. If he were dreaming
that he was sitting by the fire instead of actually sitting by the fire, he would experience
the same perceptions.

Moreover, we cannot discount this alternative hypothesis.

Descartes attempts to do so at first by pointing out that his eyes are open, he does not
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Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch (1984), 12-13.
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seem to be asleep, and everything looks very distinct. But each of these objections
themselves rely on sense experience, which the dream hypothesis has already called into
question. Thus, Descartes cannot use sense experience to support the claim that he is
sitting by the fire.
This argument can then be generalized to all beliefs about the external world. All
beliefs that presuppose the existence of objects would thus lack justification since we
support such beliefs by, at the minimum, relying on sense experience. I know there is a
tree outside. How do you know? I’ve seen it. But couldn’t you be dreaming right now?
I know that matter consists of atoms.

How do you know? I learned it in school.

Couldn’t the school have been a dream? Couldn’t the subject matter in those textbooks
have been a figment of your imagination? Couldn’t those scientists have been dreaming
the experiments? Descartes’ dream hypothesis disallows a huge swath of beliefs from
counting as knowledge. Furthermore, the alternative hypotheses are not constrained to
dream scenarios. As mentioned above, I could be systematically deceived by an evil
demon, or a bodiless brain envatted in a tub of nutrients connected to electrodes that
cause my sense perceptions (hereafter referred to as the BIV scenario). Any coherent
scenario, regardless of how fantastical, would work as an alternative hypothesis as long
as it accounts for our sense experience.
At this point, it is worth mentioning a distinction between two different
interpretations of external world skepticism—high-standards and radical.2

Some

contextualists interpret skepticism about the external world as a demand for the
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fulfillment of very high standards of knowledge. We might be justified somewhat for our
beliefs since the alternative hypotheses are unlikely, but without the ability to eliminate
these scenarios, we are not justified enough for such beliefs to count as knowledge.
Radical skeptics, however, contend that we are not justified at all in our beliefs about the
external world.

They argue that, given all the evidence we will ever have (sense

experience), skeptical scenarios are just as likely as our ordinary beliefs. Beliefs about
the external world must be justified with appropriate evidence. Such evidence consists of
sense experience. But there is no logical connection between sense experience and the
objective state of the world, as skeptical scenarios have shown us. Nor can we infer
inductively from sense experience to the external world without some access to that
world independent of sense experience.

Our evidence underdetermines what it is

justifiable to believe.3
This distinction makes a difference in how successfully certain contextualist
theories answer the skeptic. In answering high-standards skepticism, contextualists will
tend to maintain that standards shift depending on context. Descartes’ investigation takes
place in a context where all practical concerns have been placed on hold. In such a
context, one must be able to eliminate all alternative hypotheses, regardless of how
unlikely they seem.

But as explained above, one cannot.

So in the context of

contemplating the nature of knowledge before bedtime, Descartes indeed did not know
whether he was sitting before the fire. As we return to our everyday lives, however, with
our more pragmatic concerns, we do generally know what we claim to know. But this

3
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leaves the radical skeptic unscathed, since the radical skeptic does not accept that the
alternative hypotheses are unlikely in the first place. Regardless of how low a certain
context might render the standards of knowledge, the radical skeptic would still maintain
that we are never justified in our beliefs about the external world. I will explain this more
fully in IV, but suffice it to say that a contextualist theory that would preserve our
knowledge of the external world, even if only in ordinary contexts, would have to address
radical, in addition to high-standards skepticism.
Despite these obstacles, contextualist theories do have one great strength. They
recognize that, in most contexts, we do have a strong tendency to believe that we know
things about the external world. To this we now turn.
II. G.E. Moore’s Proof of an External World and Contextualist Intuitions
Skepticism is strangely evanescent.

While utterly convincing when one is

reflecting in an armchair or in a philosophy classroom, the problem of skepticism readily
recedes from the mind in the living of everyday life. Indeed, in ordinary circumstances,
the problem of skepticism seems largely irrelevant.

In assessing whether Iraq had

weapons of mass destruction prior to the war, I doubt the various intelligence officials
considered it necessary to first eliminate the possibility they were being systematically
deceived by an evil demon.

As G.E. Moore notes, I know that I have hands because I

am waving them in front of my face.4 Skeptical possibilities or not, this is sufficient
proof for my claim that I have hands. It is as sufficient as proofs get.

4

Moore (1939), 602-605.
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Moore’s “Proof of an External World” is a fascinating insistence on the
legitimacy of our ordinary justificatory practices. Moore’s general strategy is to insist
that the way we ordinarily prove things like “I know I have hands” is correct. If the basis
for which I can claim to know I have hands is correct, then I must know also that there
are external objects (my hands). Thus, skepticism is false. Moore begins by offering his
proof of an external world: He waves first one hand, saying “Here is one hand.” He
waves the other, saying “and here is another.” He then concludes that two human hands,
and thus external things, exist. To the objection that this was not sufficiently rigorous to
effectively counter skepticism, Moore lays out the criteria for a rigorous proof:
(I) The premise must differ from the conclusion.
(II) I must know the premise to be true.
(III) The conclusion must follow from the premise.
He then argues that his proof meets each of these three criteria. (I) The premises of his
proof was the waving of his hands and his saying “Here is one hand” and “Here is
another.” The conclusion differed from the premises by being more general: “Two
human hands exist at this moment.” (II) Moore insists he knew the premises to be true:
“I knew that there was one hand in the place indicated by combining a
certain gesture with my first utterance of ‘here’ and that there was another
in the different place indicated by combining a certain gesture with my
second utterance of ‘here.’ How absurd it would be to suggest that I did
not know it, but only believed it, and that perhaps it was not the case! You
might as well suggest that I do not know that I am now standing up and
talking—that perhaps after all I’m not, and that it’s not quite certain that I
am!
(III) If Moore’s premises are true, then the conclusion that “Two human hands exist at
this moment” must follow. Moore reminds us that we customarily do take proofs of this
sort as conclusive. For instance, if a question arises as to whether there are three
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misprints on a page, the best way to prove that is the case is to turn to the pages where the
misprints are and point them out. In a court of law or scientific laboratory, a proof like
this would conclusively settle the issue.
A skeptic would insist, however, that Moore does not know his premise—he does
not know that he has hands. Moore’s response is to insist that he does not have to offer a
proof of his premises in order for him to know them to be true. In a separate paper,5
Moore maintains that he is more certain of his premise than he is of the strongest premise
of any skeptical argument. But since Moore refuses to supply an argument for his
premise, the skeptic will simply say that Moore is being dogmatic.
Barry Stroud gives us an analogy that goes a long way in clarifying what Moore
takes himself to be doing.6 During a weekend party in a country house, a young duke is
found stabbed on the far side of a large table in the hall. The butler was with him the
entire time of the party except for a few seconds when he left to answer the telephone in
the foyer where there were a lot of other people. Trying to solve the crime are an
experienced detective and his eager young assistant. The assistant surmises that the
murderer must have dashed into the room when the butler answered the phone and
dashed out again before anyone noticed. The experienced detective disagrees. He says,
“No, we know this table is here and is so large that no one could have come through that
door and got around to this side of the table and stabbed the victim and got back out again
before the butler returned.” Note that the experienced detective does not need to prove to
his apprentice that the table was still in existence during the murder for this to be a
5
6

Moore, G.E. “On Certainty.”
Stroud (1984), 102-105.
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successful refutation of the apprentice’s theory. If anyone tried to prove the apprentice’s
point by denying the existence of the table, the detective would not be dogmatic in
insisting that he is certain that the table did not disappear for a few seconds at the time of
the murder. By dismissing without further justification an explanation that conflicts with
what is already known, the detective is following normal justificatory procedures. In this
circumstance, no argument for the table’s continued existence is necessary. This is what
Moore takes himself to be doing. Moore’s proof reminds us that it is normal justificatory
procedure to evaluate putative knowledge claims against what one already knows.
Here is another way of putting it. Let H designate any of the skeptical hypotheses
mentioned above (such as, “I am dreaming” or “I am a BIV (brain-in-a-vat)”) and O
designate an hypothesis to which we might ordinarily appeal in an explanation of our
sense perceptions (such as, “I have hands”). Moore’s argument can be recast as the
following:
(A) I know that O.
(B) If I know that O, then I know that not-H.
(C) I know that not-H.
The skeptic, on the other hand, argues:
(~C)
(B)
(~A)

I don’t know that not-H.
If I don’t know that not-H, then I don’t know that O.
I don’t know that O.

Both arguments, Moore’s and the skeptic’s, are equally valid.

The question then

becomes which premise (A or ~C) should one hold onto. Rather than accepting the
skeptic’s premise (~C), Moore cleaves to what he believes is already known (A). Just as
the detective dismisses the apprentice’s conclusion because it conflicts with the presence
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of the table, Moore dismisses the skeptic’s conclusion because it conflicts with the
presence of his hands.
And yet, we still feel that Moore’s proof does not sufficiently answer the skeptic.
This is because, as Stroud observes, Moore’s strategy is effective only if the piece of
knowledge used to deny a theory is not itself called into question by that theory. He
gives another analogy. Following the detective’s rebuke, the apprentice decides to be
thorough and systematically eliminate anyone at the party who could not have committed
the murder. He obtains a list of all party guests from the duke’s secretary and shows
conclusively that the only person on that list who could have committed the murder is the
butler. He then announces to the detective that he knows the butler did it. “No,” the
detective replies, “that list was simply given to you by the secretary; it could be that
someone whose name is not on the list was in the house at the time and committed the
murder. We still don’t know who did it.”7 In this circumstance, it would be absurd if the
apprentice replied, “No, I know the butler did it. Thus, the list must be complete.” Such
a reply would not be effective against the detective’s objection because it relies on a
piece of knowledge that has already been called into question by the detective’s
objection. The detective’s objection points out a flaw in the procedure the apprentice
used to come to his conclusion. He raises a possibility (that someone could have snuck
into the party without the secretary knowing) that is compatible with the apprentice’s
evidence. Unless the apprentice can eliminate that possibility, he does not know who

7
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committed the murder. He cannot simply insist that he is more certain the butler did it
than that there was someone at the party whose name is not on the list.
Similarly, Moore’s response to the skeptic relies on knowledge the skeptic has
already called into question. Moore cannot refute the skeptic by simply pointing to a
piece of knowledge he has about the external world when the skeptic has raised issues
concerning the means by which we acquire all such knowledge. The skeptic has taken a
position external to that of Moore’s, so to speak. Moore takes for granted that his
knowledge of the external world is legitimate, as we all commonly do. The skeptic,
however, takes a step back and questions whether we are right in doing so.

She

determines that we are not. It is this that prevents Moore from successfully relying on his
tactic of dismissing the skeptic’s claim. Even though it disagrees with the rest of his
knowledge about the external world, all that knowledge has been called into question as
well.
III. Relevant Alternatives and Contextualists
While Moore’s proof is ultimately insufficient, he does remind us that, ordinarily,
it is legitimate to assess knowledge claims based on an already accepted body of
knowledge (such as when the experienced detective refuses to consider that the table
might have ceased to exist for a few moments). But we also see that, when presented
with skeptical scenarios, the situation becomes like that of the apprentice who claimed to
know the butler did the crime but failed to check the completeness of the list. There
seems to be something wrong with the procedures with which we acquire knowledge
about the external world and so we are prevented from relying on any such knowledge to
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counter the skeptic.

In an attempt to resolve this issue, certain philosophers—

contextualists—contend that arguments for skepticism are effective only in certain
circumstances, certain contexts. While conducting philosophy in an armchair by the fire,
for instance, skeptical scenarios will defeat all knowledge claims about the external
world. But in ordinary circumstances—in the living of our everyday lives—skeptical
hypotheses do not function as effective defeaters. In other words, some contexts of
external world knowledge claiming might be analogous to the detective saying, “I know
the table was there,” despite the threat of skeptical scenarios. We really are able to know
of the existence of external objects because it agrees with the rest of our knowledge about
the external world. Other contexts, however, are more like the apprentice’s saying, “I
know the butler did it.” Skeptical defeaters prevent us from having knowledge of the
external world because we cannot rely on any previous knowledge we might have about
the external world. But it depends on the context. What this means is that while one may
temporarily lose one’s knowledge in the context of, say, philosophy, one regains it again
in more mundane circumstances.
How is this accomplished? According to some contextualists, the skeptic is able
to take away our knowledge of the external world by manipulating the semantic standards
for knowledge. The very act of bringing up a skeptical defeater raises the standards for
knowledge so high that we are no longer able to meet it. As the standards rise, so too
must the strength of one’s epistemic position when making a knowledge claim. Under
the high standards imposed by the skeptic, one’s epistemic position is never strong
enough and so our external world knowledge claims are false. In ordinary circumstances,
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however, the standards for knowledge fall back down to their normal levels and we again
know things about the external world.
An early form of contextualism, the “relevant alternatives” view, maintained that
claims to know are made within a context of possible defeaters. But not all defeaters
must be eliminated in order to truly claim to know—just the relevant ones, and which
count as relevant change from context to context. As the relevant defeaters change, so
too does the meaning of the knowledge attribution. Gail Stine makes use of an example
by Fred Dretske.8 Suppose that I am viewing zebras at a zoo. As these creatures have all
the stripes and other various fashionings of a zebra, as they are being housed in a cage
labeled “Zebra,” I believe them to be zebras and can truly say, “I know these animal are
zebras.” That I cannot eliminate the alternative hypothesis that these animals are mules
painted to look like zebras does not make my knowledge claim false. That alternative is
irrelevant in this case. As such, when I say, “I know these animals are zebras,” what I
really mean is, “I know these animals are zebras rather than horses or antelopes or some
other animal commonly found at a zoo.” However, if the context changes such that the
painted mule alternative does become relevant, then I cannot truly say, “I know these
animals are zebras.” In such a context, “I know these animals are zebras” would really
mean, “I know these animals are zebras rather than cleverly painted mules,” a claim that
is clearly false. In this way, relevant alternatives theorists argue that context changes the
very meaning of S knows p:
“So what one means when one says that John knows the animal is a zebra,
is that he knows it is a zebra, as opposed to a gazelle, an antelope, or other
8

Dretske (1970).
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animals one would normally expect to find in a zoo. If, however, being a
mule painted to look like a zebra became a relevant alternative, then one
would literally mean something different in saying that John knows that
the animal is a zebra from what one meant originally and that something
else may well be false.”9 (Italics added.)
This is how we can say “S knows p” is true in one context but false in another without
contradiction.
For the sake of clarity, some comments about the notion of meaning must be
made here. To employ Keith DeRose’s terms, “know” can be used with the same
“character” but with different “content.” While the character of “know” remains the
same across contexts, the content can change. In all contexts, the character of “S knows
that p” remains roughly, “S has a true belief that p and is in a good enough epistemic
position with respect to p.” What counts as good enough is part of the content of the
attribution and depends on certain factors of the context. When an alternative hypothesis
is raised and thus made relevant, the content of “know” changes so that the knowledge
attributor is now required to be in a stronger epistemic position, one that can discount
such hypotheses, in order to count as knowing.
Yet, not all relevant alternative theories are contextualist. We must also pay
attention to how features in the context affect the range of relevant alternatives.10
DeRose draws a distinction between “subject factors” and “attributor factors.” Subject
factors are features of the context having to do with the putative knower’s situation.
Using Alvin Goldman’s barn façade case as an example, a subject in ordinary
circumstances can be truly said to know what he is seeing is a barn even if he cannot rule
9

Stine (1976), reprinted in DeRose & Warfield (1999), p. 150.
DeRose (1992).
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out the possibility that it is a barn façade. But if the subject factors change such that the
subject is now in an area where barn facades are a regular occurrence, then that what he is
seeing is a barn façade becomes a relevant alternative. Attributor factors, on the other
hand, have to do with the knowledge attributor’s situation, with her linguistic and
psychological context. If the attributor factors are such that she is in a philosophy class
where Descartes’ evil demon is being discussed, then this becomes a relevant alternative
where ordinarily it would not be considered. Sometimes, the putative knower and the
knowledge attributor are the same person, as in the case where I claim, “I know I have
hands.” When we attribute knowledge to someone else, however, or when one person
attributes knowledge to another, then the subject of knowledge and the attributor of
knowledge diverge.
This distinction is important in defining contextualist theories because only a
contextualist will allow that attributor factors affect the range of relevant alternatives. An
invariantist, someone who does not think the standards for knowledge change with the
context, can allow that subject factors affect the range of relevant alternatives but not
attributor factors. Take Dretske’s zebra case, for example. Let’s say Bob is looking at
the zebras. In ordinary circumstances, I can truly say, “Bob knows those animals are
zebras.” If, unbeknownst to me, the zoo has a habit of replacing zebras with cleverly
painted mules thereby changing the subject factors of the context, then the same
attribution of knowledge is false, but not because the content of my knowledge attribution
has changed. Indeed, it is difficult to see how I can mean, “Bob knows those animals are
zebras rather than antelopes” in one context and “Bob knows those animals are zebras
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rather than cleverly painted mules” in a different context when I remain unaware of the
change in circumstance. Rather than raising the standards for knowledge, the change in
subject factors have weakened my epistemic position. Subject factors change the truth
value of knowledge attributions without changing the truth conditions (or meaning) of
those attributions.

Attributor factors, however, do affect the truth conditions of

knowledge attributions. As DeRose notes:
Attributor factors set a certain standard the putative subject of knowledge
must live up to in order to make the knowledge attribution true: They
affect how good an epistemic position the putative knower must be in to
count as knowing. They thereby affect the truth conditions and the content
or meaning of the attribution. Subject factors, on the other hand,
determine whether or not the putative subject lives up to the standards that
have been set, and thereby can affect the truth value of the attribution
without affecting its content: They affect how good an epistemic position
the putative knower actually is in.11
A contextualist can thus account for the intuitions behind both the skeptic’s
argument and Moore’s argument. Under ordinary circumstances, I can truly say “I know
I have hands” because the standards for knowledge are low enough that my being able to
wave my hands around puts me in a good enough epistemic position to count as knowing.
However, once a skeptical hypothesis has been raised and my range of relevant
alternatives changes, my current epistemic position is no longer good enough. I can no
longer truly say, “I know I have hands.”

11

DeRose (1992) p. 497.
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IV. Some Objections
The strength of contextualism rests in its intuitive appeal. The skeptic’s argument
and Moore’s appear convincing when viewed separately but incompatible when put
together. Consider the following four propositions:
(A)
(E)
(D)
(~C)

I know that O.
I know that O entails not-H.
If I know that p, and I know that p entails q, then I know that q.
I do not know that not-H.

(A) is the first premise in Moore’s argument. (~C) is the denial of the conclusion in
Moore’s argument and the first premise in the skeptic’s argument. (D) is the principle of
deductive closure. According to deductive closure, if (A) I know that O, and (E) I know
that O entails not-H, then (C) I must also know that not-H. So, if (A), (E), and (D) are
true, then (~C) must be false. If (~C), (D), and (E) are true, then (A) must be false. If
(A), (E), and (~C) are true, then (D) must be false. (A), (E), (D), and (~C) are jointly
inconsistent: we cannot accept all four at the same time. But which do we deny, as all
four are also very plausible? This question is what Ram Neta calls the skeptical puzzle.12
The appeal of contextualism rests on its ability to solve this puzzle in the course
salvaging our ordinary claims to knowledge. We can avoid flatly denying either (A), (E),
(D), or (~C). While there have been various objections leveled against contextualism,
they seem to be answerable in a way that does not threaten this basic contextualist
approach.

In what follows, I will highlight some of these problems and their

corresponding answers, culminating in a contextualist account that seems to adequately
address all these problems. This will serve as a prelude to my discussion of an objection
12

Neta (2003) p. 5.
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that does threaten the basic contextualist approach, which I will take up in the next
section.
Gail Stine’s relevant alternatives theory has been alluded to briefly above. To
summarize, Stine maintains S knows that p only if S can rule out all the alternatives to p
that are relevant in S’s context. Thus, in ordinary circumstances, I do not need to rule out
the hypothesis that the zebras at the zoo are really cleverly painted mules because that
alternative is not relevant in my current context. However, if a serious zebra-skeptic
happens to raise the possibility that what I am seeing may be a cleverly painted mule,
then that alternative becomes relevant and I would not know that I am looking at zebras
without being able to rule out that alternative.
Ignoring, for the moment, DeRose’s distinction between subject factors and
attributor factors, the application of Stine’s theory to the skeptical puzzle should be clear.
In ordinary circumstances, skeptical hypotheses (H’s) are not relevant alternatives. Thus,
I do not need to rule out the notion that I might be a BIV in order to know that I have
hands. And, if I know that I have hands, I also know that I am not a BIV. This is why, in
ordinary circumstances, skeptical hypotheses fade into the background. The context is
such that they are simply irrelevant. When conducting philosophy, however, the BIV
hypothesis does become relevant. Because I cannot rule it out, in that context, I do not
know that I have hands. In the philosophical context, skeptical scenarios regain their
cogency. In effect, Stine argues that in ordinary contexts, we agree with Moore:
(A)
(B)
(C)

I know that O.
If know that O, then I know that not-H.
I know that not-H.

19

But in extraordinary contexts when various H’s become relevant, we agree with the
skeptic:
(~C)
(B)
(~A)

I don’t know that not-H.
If I don’t know that not-H, then I don’t know that O.
I don’t know that O.

Because the skeptic’s argument applies only in very special circumstances that do not
normally apply in our ordinary contexts, the skeptic’s conclusion does not generalize to
cover the contexts in which we ordinarily make our knowledge claims. My knowledge of
external objects is preserved for the most part. Moreover, Stine can account for the
plausibility of each of the propositions in the skeptical puzzle by maintaining they are all
true but each only in certain contexts.
Stine’s account, however, has a problem. She has to maintain not only (~C) I
don’t know that not-H, in circumstances where H is relevant, but also (C) I do know that
not-H, in circumstances where H is not relevant.

This is because Stine’s relevant

alternatives theory is constructed to preserve the deductive closure (D) that creates the
entailment in (B). So, in ordinary circumstances, I know that O. To know this, however,
I would need sufficient evidence to support my belief that O. But if I had sufficient
evidence to know that O, and O entails not-H, I would have sufficient evidence to know
that not-H, regardless of circumstance.

As argued by Stewart Cohen13 and further

explicated by Ram Neta,14 Stine is committed to the denial of either:
(D1)

13
14

Cohen (1988).
Neta (2003).

If I have sufficient evidence to know p and I know that p entails not-q,
then I have sufficient evidence to know not-q.
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Or
(D2)

My knowledge that O requires that my belief that O be based on some
sufficient evidence for the proposition that O.

But (D1) and (D2) are just as plausible as (A), (D) or (~C). The denial of either (D1) or
(D2) would counteract the intuitive appeal of not flatly denying (A), (D), and (~C).
In trying to resolve these difficulties, Cohen, like DeRose, appeals to the context
of the knowledge attributor in addition to that of the putative knower. As discussed in the
previous section, Stine’s account pits knowledge as dependent on subject factors. The
putative knower’s context determines whether alternative H is relevant. According to
Cohen, the relevance of H is also dependent on attributor factors. More specifically, let
us say Jim believes he is looking at zebras because the creatures he is looking at have
black and white stripes. That the zebras are really cleverly painted mules would be a
relevant alternative if Jim’s circumstances (his reasons for believing and other contextual
factors) are such that the cleverly painted mule scenario is sufficiently probable, and what
counts as sufficient depends on the context I am in, since I am the one claiming Jim
knows something. In addition, if Jim does not have sufficient evidence to discount the
cleverly painted mule scenario, the level of sufficiency again being dependent on my
context, it would make the alternative relevant. Since the relevance of an alternative
determines whether it needs to be ruled out in order for Jim to know that he sees zebras,
and the relevance of an alternative depends on the context of the knowledge attributor, it
is possible for one person to truthfully say that Jim knows he sees zebras and another to
truthfully say Jim does not, without contradicting the first.
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As a solution to the skeptical problem, this means that relative to some contexts, I
have sufficient evidence to know that O and thus not-H. Relative to other contexts, I do
not have sufficient evidence to know that not-H and so do not know that O. In all
contexts, however, I can still maintain (D1) and (D2) in addition to the closure principle
(D).
Neta points out, however, that if I want to maintain (D2), I would also need to
have sufficient evidence that not-H. If my contention that O requires sufficient evidence,
then there does not seem to be any reason why my contention that not-H would not
similarly require sufficient evidence. Yet what would count as sufficient evidence for the
proposition that not-H, regardless of how low my context sets the standard of
sufficiency? Cohen attempts to resolve this problem by claiming that my belief that notH is “intrinsically rational” and so does not require evidence. If this is the case, then
what makes not-H more intrinsically rational than O, such that O requires evidence but
not-H does not? This remains unclear.
David Lewis’ contextualist account relies on what he calls the Rule of Attention.
According to Lewis, S knows that p if and only if p holds in every possibility
uneliminated by S’s evidence (except for those possibilities we are properly ignoring).
Proper ignoring, in turn, depends on attributor factors. While Lewis covers numerous
contextual factors that affect the truth-value of knowledge attributions, it is the Rule of
Attention that he relies on to resolve the skeptical puzzle. In keeping with the Rule of
Attention, a possibility not ignored at all cannot be properly ignored. Thus, if the
possibility that H comes up, the context becomes such that I cannot properly ignore it.
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Since I have no evidence to discount this possibility, (~C) becomes true. I thus cannot
truthfully say that I know O. However, in other contexts where the possibility that H
does not come up, I can properly ignore it and so do not need to discount it in order to
truthfully claim (A). Thus, I would know also that not-H by (D).
Unfortunately, Lewis’ account does not successfully overcome an objection Keith
DeRose levied against an earlier version of his argument.15 According to DeRose, a Rule
of Accommodation (which would presumably include the Rule of Attention) cannot
adequately explain the persuasiveness of any skeptical argument that relies on a skeptical
hypothesis. Imagine two skeptics, he says, one of which claims (~C) I do not know I am
not a BIV. The second only dogmatically insists that (~A) I do not know that I have
hands, and offers no reason to believe her claim. DeRose believes that a solution to the
skeptical puzzle should at the very least be able to explain why the first skeptic (~C) is
more convincing than the second (~A). The Rule of Attention is unable to do this.
According to this rule, arguments based on the BIV scenario are persuasive because
bringing up the BIV possibility creates a context where the BIV hypothesis must be
discounted in order for there to be knowledge. But this means that the argument of the
second dogmatic skeptic should be just as persuasive as the BIV skeptic. The dogmatic
skeptic brings up the possibility that I do not have hands. The Rule of Attention states
that, since this possibility has been brought up, I cannot ignore it and so must discount it.
I cannot discount it because I cannot discount the possibility that I am not a BIV. Yet

15

DeRose (1995).
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(~A) is not near as convincing as (~C). The Rule of Attention, because it applies equally
to both skeptics, cannot account for this.
DeRose offers his own contextualist theory to account for the persuasiveness of
effective skeptical hypotheses. Building off of Nozick’s account of knowledge, DeRose
terms his account the Subjunctive Conditional Account (SCA).

According to this

account, the belief that I am not a BIV is problematic because I would have this belief
regardless of whether it is true. My belief that I am not a BIV does not “track the truth,”
so to speak. SCA posits that we are strongly inclined to think we do not know p if we
think p is a belief we would hold even if it were false. DeRose refers to this as an
insensitive belief. In order for p to count as knowledge, p must be sensitive through a
sufficient range of possible worlds, called “epistemically relevant worlds,” centered
around the actual world. What counts as a sufficient range depends on context. In
contexts where the standards for knowledge are set relatively low, the range of
epistemically relevant worlds is small. In contexts where the standards for knowledge are
high, the range increases.
To apply SCA to the skeptical puzzle, DeRose introduces the “Rule of
Sensitivity”: When it is asserted that S knows (or doesn’t know) p, then, if necessary,
enlarge the sphere of epistemically relevant worlds so that it at least includes the closest
worlds in which p is false. This is the mechanism by which context raises the standards
for knowledge. When the skeptic asserts that I do not know I am not a BIV, she creates a
context where the sphere of epistemically relevant worlds enlarges so that it includes at
least the closest worlds in which I am a BIV. But since my belief that I am not a BIV is
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insensitive, the truth does not track across the epistemically relevant worlds where I am a
BIV. Thus, in this context, I do not know that I am not a BIV. Moreover, my epistemic
position with respect to the proposition that I am not a BIV is at least as strong as my
epistemic position with respect to the proposition that I have hands. According to
DeRose, S’s epistemic position with respect to p is at least as strong as S’s epistemic
position with respect to q just in case the following is true across all contexts of
attribution: if, relative to that context, S knows that q, then relative to that same context,
S knows that p. In other words, DeRose preserves the deductive closure first mentioned
above (D). So, in this context, since I do not now that I am not a BIV, I do not know that
I have hands. If, however, the subject of my being a BIV does not come up when I assert
that I have hands, the context is such that the range of epistemically relevant worlds
extend only to the closest worlds where I do not have hands (such as worlds where I am
involved in a nasty car accident or some such thing). In this context, the belief that I have
hands does track the truth through the range of epistemically possible worlds. And
because deductive closure is retained, I can conclude that I am not a BIV.
Now, recall that DeRose fashioned SCA so that it could explain why certain
skeptical hypotheses persuade and others do not. Consider the dogmatic skeptic’s claim
that I don’t have hands.

Bringing up this hypothesis fails to change the range of

epistemically relevant worlds through which my belief must track. The epistemically
relevant worlds for this claim are the same as those generated by the proposition that I do
have hands, since those worlds already included the closest ones where I do not have
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hands. Since my belief tracks through all the epistemically relevant worlds, I am not
inclined to be convinced that I don’t have hands.
Neta points out a flaw in DeRose’s account.16 To address unconvincing skeptical
hypotheses that are nonetheless in accordance with the Rule of Sensitivity, such as I
falsely believe that I have hands, DeRose adds that an effective skeptical hypothesis must
also explain why I would have such a belief. Neta, however, offers the following
counterexamples:
(H1)

I falsely believe that I have hands because I’ve been hit on the head in
such a way as to cause me to have that false belief, but not to have any of
the sensory experiences and memories that would provide me with reasons
for believing that I have hands.

(H2)

I falsely believe that I have hands because I’ve taken a drug that causes me
to have that false belief (but not to have any sensory experiences or
memories that seem to support that false belief).

(H3)

I falsely believe that I have hands because I want to believe it, and my
wishes cause me to have that false belief (but not to have any sensory
experiences or memories that seem to support that false belief).

Each of these hypotheses offer beliefs that are insensitive across the range of
epistemically relevant worlds as well as explanations for why I falsely believe I have
hands. Yet each of these three hypotheses remain unconvincing. Knowing what my
beliefs should be based on (perceptual evidence, etc.), I would contend that in these
situations, I know I don’t have hands. We find that the explanations must be of a certain
type. The hypotheses above offer merely causal explanations, whereas the explanation
for the belief in an effective skeptical hypothesis must appeal to my evidence for that

16

Neta (2003).
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belief. Indeed, we find that effective skeptical hypotheses work by showing that the
evidence to which we normally appeal is misleading.
This gives us a way of addressing one other concern about whether contextualist
theories really do provide an answer to skepticism. The contextualist strategies above
contend that the skeptic achieves her goals by illicitly raising the standards of knowledge.
Michael Williams argues that such strategies do not address skepticism of the external
world.17 Rather, they address what he calls high-standards skepticism. High-standards
skeptics insist that knowledge requires certainty. They do not deny that justified true
belief is possible, but maintain rather that our ordinary standards of justification do not
reach those necessary for knowledge. Indeed, DeRose charges the skeptic with holding
the standards of knowledge so high that she ultimately changes the meaning of “know”
from that of its ordinary use. It is analogous to insisting that a “doctor” is someone who
has never had a patient die. If this is what one means by “doctor” or “know”, it is
difficult to see why one should care about problems concerning a concept no one
employs in real life.
Skepticism about the external world, on the other hand, is what Williams calls a
radical skepticism. Radical skepticism does not merely say that most of our beliefs are
not justified enough to meet some standard. Rather, it denies the very possibility of
justified belief. The radical skeptic insists that given all our available evidence, skeptical
scenarios are no less likely than what we ordinarily believe. The only basis we have for
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Williams (2001), 74-75.
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declaring skeptical hypotheses remote is based on the very perceptual evidence that the
skeptic has called into question.
We can see how this plays out in DeRose’s SCA. Recall that the “Rule of
Sensitivity” demands that whenever it is asserted that S knows (or doesn’t know) p, we
enlarge the sphere of epistemically relevant worlds so that it at least includes the closest
worlds in which p is false.

In making the claim that I know I have hands, it is

automatically assumed that the closest epistemically relevant worlds where p is false are
those where my hands have been hacked off by an automobile accident or some such
relatively plausible scenario. It is certainly not assumed that the closest such world is the
BIV world or the evil demon world. But what do I rely on to determine which worlds are
the closest ones? If closeness depends on likelihood, then I have no basis for saying that
the car accident world is closer than the BIV world. To determine which worlds are more
likely, I would have to rely at least partially on the perceptual experiences the skeptic has
called into question—perceptual experience from the past, say. The same applies if
closeness depends on something like plausibility, or even similarity. I would thus have
no basis for saying that my belief that I have hands tracks across all epistemically
relevant words, since I would have no basis for saying that a BIV world would not be
epistemically relevant.
According to Neta, introducing a skeptical hypothesis does not raise the standards
of knowledge so high that we cannot meet them. Rather, as we saw in our discussion of
what makes an effective skeptical hypothesis, it disqualifies what we can count as
evidence for O. This goes back to our previous discussion of Stroud’s objection to
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Moore.

Recall that Moore’s strategy of appealing to our already existing body of

knowledge is effective only if that body of knowledge has not been called into question
by the skeptic.

Otherwise, such an appeal would be no better than the apprentice

dogmatically insisting that the list is complete when the master detective points out that
the completeness of the list has not yet been confirmed.

Skeptical hypotheses are

similarly effective only when they call into question the procedures by which we come to
the conclusion that O. They do so by disqualifying that which we would normally appeal
to justify O—our evidence for O.
Neta maintains that we can recast the skeptical puzzle in the form of an
evidentiary puzzle to take this into account:
(A*) I have evidence for O.
(D*) If I have evidence for p, and I know that p entails q, I have evidence for q.
(~C*) I have no evidence for not-H.
Like the skeptical puzzle, each of these three propositions are individually plausible but
jointly inconsistent. Unless we wish to deny (D2), (A*) follows from (A). (D*) follows
from (D) and (D2). And as for (~C*), what could count as evidence for not-H?
Accordingly, a contextualist theory that addresses radical skepticism would have
to provide a solution to the evidentiary puzzle as well as the skeptical puzzle. Neta
attempts this by contextualizing what counts as evidence. According to Neta, by raising
the possibility that H, the skeptic shifts the conversational context in line with the
following rule:
(Neta) When one raises an hypothesis H that is an uneliminated
counterpossibility with respect to S’s knowing that p at t, one restricts
what counts in one’s context of appraisal as S’s body of evidence at t to
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just those mental states that S has, and would have, at t whether or not H is
true.
A hypothesis H is “an uneliminated counterpossibility” with respect to S’s knowing that
p at t just in case (i) H implies that S doesn’t know that p at t and (ii) H and “S knows that
p at t” are introspectively indistinguishable for S.

Two hypotheses h1 and h2 are

“introspectively indistinguishable for S” just in case: (i) If h1 were true, then S would be
in mental states M1; (ii) if h2 were true, then S would be in mental states M2; and (iii)
there is no difference between M1 and M2 for S that is available to S’s introspection.
“Context of appraisal” refers to the knowledge attributor’s context.
There are several advantages to this view. Like DeRose’s contextualism, Neta’s
account explains why the BIV hypothesis is convincing but “I don’t have hands” is not.
The BIV hypothesis is an uneliminated counterpossibility to O whereas “I don’t have
hands” is not. Further, (Neta) recognizes that what counts as evidence is dependent on
the conversational context of the knowledge attributor. So, for S to have evidence for p is
for S to have evidence that favors p over some alternative(s) that are relevant in the
attributor’s context. For example, suppose that Richard is drinking Coke. Both Bob and
Suzanne ask if Richard has evidence that he is drinking Coke. Bob asks because Richard
frequently expresses a preference for Coke over Pepsi but Richard doubts that Bob can
taste the difference. Suzanne asks because she does not think Richard is experienced
enough in carbonated beverages to be able to taste the difference between Coke and
Sprite. It would then be possible for Richard to have evidence that he is drinking Coke in
Suzanne’s context but not in Bob’s.

Since drinking Sprite is introspectively

distinguishable from drinking Coke for Richard, his drinking Coke counts as evidence
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that he is drinking Coke. That he might be drinking Pepsi is not relevant to Suzanne’s
context. Bob, however, does raise drinking Pepsi as an uneliminated counterpossibility.
Because drinking Coke and drinking Pepsi is introspectively indistinguishable for
Richard, he does not have evidence that he is drinking Coke in Bob’s context.
Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the evidentiary puzzle and the
skeptical puzzle are generated by (Neta). Once the skeptic raises the BIV hypothesis, she
shifts the context such that the only evidence I can appeal to is just those mental states
that are introspectively available to me regardless of whether or not I am a BIV. Thus,
what I had originally considered to be my knowledge of the external world no longer
counts as evidence.

In such a context, (~C*) and (~C) are true.

When no such

hypothesis has been raised, however, (A) and (A*) are true. I know that I have hands
because my being able to wave them around counts as evidence. That I am handed is
introspectively distinguishable from non-handedness. (D) and (D*) are true regardless of
context.
V. A Larger Problem
When looking at how “knows” is utilized in non-philosophical conversation, it
does appear that the evidence necessary to justify a knowledge claim may change from
one context to another. Such seeming variability in our attributions of knowledge is part
of what makes contextualism so enticing.

Unfortunately, it is less clear whether this

variability in what appears to be appropriate attributions of knowledge reflect variability
in the truth conditions of knowledge.
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Here is the problem. In appealing to contextualist intuitions, a contextualist will
frequently present two cases of the same individual making or denying a knowledge
claim. In Case A, the individual will claim to know p and one intuits that this claim is
true. In Case B, the conversational context will have shifted and the same individual will
now claim to not know p. And one intuits that this claim is also true. The contextualist
will then explain the conflicting intuitions by positing that the change in conversational
context in Case B raised the standards of knowledge. Thus, one can both know p in Case
A and not know p in Case B because the standards for knowledge have been raised in
Case B. Here is an example from DeRose:18
Bank Case A. My spouse and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon and we
are discussing whether to stop at the bank to deposit our paychecks. Passing the bank, we
see that the lines are quite long so I suggest we drive straight home and go on Saturday
instead. My spouse says, “Maybe the bank will be closed tomorrow. A lot of banks
close on Saturdays.” I reply, “No, I know it’ll be open. I was there two weeks ago on
Saturday. It’s open until noon.”
Bank Case B. Imagine the same situation as in Case A except we have just
written a very large and important check that requires the deposit of our paychecks by
Saturday for our account to reach sufficient funds. Again, the lines are long and I suggest
we go back on Saturday. My spouse reminds me that banks are closed on Sunday, so the
paycheck must be deposited either today or Saturday. And, “Banks do change their
hours. Do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?” Though I am just as confident as
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DeRose (1992).
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in Case A that the bank will be open on Saturday, I reply, “Well, no. I’d better go and
make sure.”
There is a strong sense here that I know the bank will open on Saturday in Case A
but not in Case B. As mentioned above, contextualism provides one way of explaining
these conflicting intuitions. An invariantist, however, can object by drawing a distinction
between true assertions of knowledge and warranted assertions of knowledge. My claim
to know the bank will open on Saturday is false in Case A but warranted, given the low
cost of being wrong and time-saving benefits of being right. In that case, it is not
knowledge that context affects but warranted assertability.
In “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context,” Keith DeRose proposes a solution to
this problem.19 He suggests that we marry contextualism with a theory of warranted
assertion called the knowledge account of assertion, thus providing a needed link
between knowledge and warranted assertion. It is generally agreed that in order to
appropriately assert that p, one must be well-enough positioned with respect to p. The
controversy revolves around what counts as “well-enough positioned.” According to the
knowledge account, one is well-enough positioned only if one knows that p. One can see
how this maneuver is meant to work. If there is general agreement that context affects
warranted assertibility and warranted assertibility is linked directly to knowledge, then
there can be general agreement that context affects knowledge.
DeRose first argues that the skeptic’s objection to contextualism cannot be just
the bare claim that the contextualist is mistaking the conditions for warranted assertions

19

DeRose (2002).

33

with the truth-conditions of knowledge. As explained above, the warranted assertability
objector will have to maintain that, despite intuitions to the contrary, S either knows p in
both contexts or does not know p in both contexts.

One of the contextualist’s

assessments is wrong. If we have intuitions that S knows that P in one of those contexts,
it is only because S has fulfilled the conditions for asserting p appropriately, which, as I
argued above, can be different from fulfilling the conditions for actually knowing p. So,
in that context, “S knows that p” would be false while “S appropriately asserted p” would
be true. But, objects DeRose, this type of maneuver could be used to make all sorts of
ridiculous arguments by allowing the proponent of a view to explain away any
counterexample. Imagine someone who tries to argue that “S knows that p” has the same
truth conditions as “S believes that p.” Then, to address the numerous counterexamples
that appear to show that the truth of p might also be required, the proponent of this view
could say that the truth of p only appears to be a truth-condition of “S knows that p”
because it is an assertability condition.
What is needed for a plausible employment of this maneuver is a general
conversational rule that the assertability condition can fall under.

For instance, if

someone asked me for my mother’s maiden name and I knew it to be Lee, it would be
somehow inappropriate, though true, for me to answer, “It’s possible that it’s Lee.” Such
an answer would be inappropriate because an assertability condition of “It’s possible that
p” might be that you are not in a position to know that P is true. And this, in turn, falls
under a general conversational rule that says: When you’re in a position to assert either
of two things, then, other things being equal, assert the stronger. I am in a position to
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assert either the stronger, “It’s Lee,” or the weaker, “It’s possible that it’s Lee.” If I
assert, “It’s possible it’s Lee,” I generate a false implicature that I do not know my
mother’s maiden name is Lee. The plausibility of this view (as compared to the “S
knows that p” = “S believes that p” view above) stems from the fact that the “Assert the
stronger” conversational rule applies to propositions of any content, not just the term in
question.
In order for the warranted assertability objection against contextualism to be
plausible, there needs to be a general conversational rule for the assertability conditions
of “S knows that p” to fall under. And indeed there is. There is a general conversational
rule that says: One should assert something only if one is well-enough positioned with
respect to that proposition to properly assert it. This is a conversational rule that applies
to “S knows that p” and how well positioned one must be in to assert “S knows that p”
varies based on context. So, one can be well-enough positioned with respect to “S knows
that p” to assert it even though one is not well-enough positioned to actually know it.
It is this objection that the knowledge account of assertion is brought in to address
in the second stage of DeRose’s argument. According to the knowledge account of
assertion, one must know that p in order to be well-enough positioned with respect to p to
assert it. Hence, by asserting p, you represent yourself as knowing p, though you are not
asserting that you know p. Warranted assertions, then, depend on knowledge and exhibit
context variability because, as the contextualist will maintain, knowledge exhibits context
variability.
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Although DeRose’s focus is less on arguing for the knowledge account of
assertion and more on establishing that the knowledge account, if true, supports
contextualism, it is worth addressing some of the more serious objections to this theory of
assertion. As I will argue further below, the way in which the knowledge account deals
with these objections actually renders its benefits to contextualism moot.
The first counterexample concerns cases in which a person reasonably makes an
assertion that is false. Take Goldman’s barn façade case mentioned in the previous
section. Given how unusual it is to find oneself in barn façade country, the subject can
hardly be blamed for asserting that he knows what he is seeing is a barn when it is in fact
a barn façade. This certainly seems to be a case in which one does not know p but can
make a warranted assertion that p.
The second counterexample concerns cases in which a person reasonably makes
an assertion that is true, but that still does not qualify as knowledge. Consider the
following example, adapted from Stroud. During wartime, airplane spotters are given a
quick course on how to spot different types of airplanes. They learn from their manuals
that an airplane with features x, y, and w is an E, and an airplane with features x, y, and z
is an F. The completely trained airplane spotter will then announce the presence of an F
only if he sees all three features x, y, and z. If he sees only x and y but cannot determine
the third feature, he does not know whether the plane is an E or an F.
Suppose also that, unbeknownst to the airplane spotter, there is another airplane,
G, that also has features x, y, and z. The manual never mentioned them because it was
unnecessary for the airplane spotters to be able to identify them. While they are as
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common as F’s, they are not very dangerous. With the exigencies of war, it was more
expedient to train the airplane spotters to identify E’s and F’s but ignore the G’s. In such
a situation, the airplane spotters do not know an airplane is an F if they see features x, y,
and z, even if they are really looking at an F. Just as the spotters do not know an airplane
is an F if they see only features x and y because it might be an E, they do not know an
airplane is an F if they see features x, y, and z because it might be a G. But given the
exigencies of war, it certainly seems as if the airplane spotter is warranted in asserting he
knows an airplane is an F when he sees features x, y, and z.
In defending the knowledge account of assertion, Timothy Williamson addresses
such counterexamples in part by insisting that an assertion made by an asserter who does
not know is technically unwarranted.20 The intuition that the subject can not be held
blameworthy for making a reasonable but false assertion or a reasonable true assertion
that does not count as knowledge can be explained by invoking rules or conventions of
behavior other than those governing solely assertions. In the airplane spotter case, for
example, the warranted assertion intuition might derive from moral or behavioral rules
that come into play when action is required to save lives. So while the airplane spotter
technically did make an unwarranted assertion by falsely representing himself as
knowing when he really did not, this is counterbalanced by the positive consequences of
his making the unwarranted assertion. The asserter might have been blameless in his act
of asserting, but the assertion itself remains unwarranted.
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This removes any benefit that the knowledge account of assertion might provide
to contextualism. DeRose would like to answer the invariantist by maintaining that
contextual factors affect whether an assertion of knowledge is warranted because only
knowledge warrants assertion, and contextual factors affect the truth conditions of
knowledge.

Thus, recalling the bank cases, if I am warranted in my assertion of

knowledge in Bank Case A, it is because my assertion of knowledge is true in Bank Case
A. The knowledge account of assertion, however, allows the invariantist to explain the
intuitions behind the bank cases without agreeing with the antecedent of the preceding
conditional. The invariantist can simply say that I am technically not warranted in my
assertion of knowledge in Bank Case A. Rather, it only seems so because of extraneous
behavioral rules that are not constitutive of solely assertions. In fact, I falsely represented
myself as knowing that the bank will be open on Saturday, but am warranted in doing so
because of more pragmatic concerns. In this way, the invariantist can maintain that it is
neither knowledge nor warranted assertion that is context dependent, but rather behavior
in general.
Indeed, it is often the case that we make knowledge claims not for the sake of
transmitting knowledge alone but because we think doing so will accomplish some more
desired goal like saving time or saving lives. Contextual factors may determine how
important it is to actually succeed in transmitting knowledge in order to accomplish that
goal. Perhaps this is what underlies the intuitions upon which contextualism is based.
To establish the link between context and knowledge, contextualists need to
explain the relationship between attributor factors and the fact that p, such that attributor
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factors should play a role in determining whether one is justified in believing p. From the
airplane spotter’s point of view, any airplane with features x, y, and z are F’s. He has no
reason to doubt this as this is what he learned in training and this is what it says in the
manual. From our point of view, however, we are able to see that there are also G planes
that the manual does not cover. From our epistemic position outside of the airplane
spotter’s situation, we can see that the manual is an inadequate basis for the plane
spotter’s knowledge claim. The airplane spotter is not himself at fault for thinking he
knows a plane is an F. And his ability to identify F’s is perfectly adequate for the
purposes of the war effort. Nonetheless, the fact that an airplane might be an F or a G is
independent from whether the airplane spotter’s training was perfectly adequate for the
war. It is this independence between the facts of the matter concerning the identity of the
airplanes and the purposes for the plane spotter’s knowledge claims that proves
problematic for contextualism.
Now, I do not believe a contextualist would claim the airplane spotter knows an
airplane with features x, y, and z is an F. That it might be a G is a relevant alternative due
to subject factors. Just as one would not know what one is seeing is a barn in barn-façade
country, one does not know an F from a G when there are also G’s flying around. The
problem is, rather, that there seems to be a disconnect between the attributor factors in the
airplane spotter’s context and the facts of the matter. A contextualist would maintain that
the exigencies of war (the attributor factors in this case) play a part in determining how
good an epistemic position the airplane spotter must be in to know that an airplane is an
F. But the exigencies of war have nothing to do with whether the airplane is an F or a G.
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The skeptic believes herself to be in a position similar to our position relative to
the airplane spotter. The exigencies of war make it such that the airplane spotter thinks
he knows a plane is an F when he knows no such thing. Standing outside the airplane
spotter’s context and removed from the exigencies of war, we can see that the airplane
might very well be a G. The skeptic similarly places herself outside any context in which
practical needs might drive claims to know. From there, she can see that what we take to
be the external world might just be a dream or some other skeptical hypothesis. Just as
we can see that the exigencies of war play no part in whether a plane is in fact an F or a
G, the skeptic sees contextual factors as playing no part in whether what we sense around
us is in fact the external world or merely a dream. As long as there is this independence
between: (1) the contextual factors that drive knowledge claims, and (2) the facts around
us; contextualism will remain implausible.
Do I believe that the skeptic is right, then, in that we really have no knowledge of
the external world? No, I do admit that the intuition behind (A) I know that O is quite
strong. And while contextualism might not be the answer to the skeptic, it is nonetheless
possible that something else might step into the breach.
contextualism is not the answer.

I am simply arguing that
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